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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000855

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SUBJECT: ANP PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTING COMMENCES

Classified By: POLITICAL MILITARY COUNSELOR CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.  
4 (B) AND (D).

(C/REL ISAF)Subject: ANP Personnel and Equipment Accounting  
Commences

1.(C/REL ISAF) Summary: The inability to identify the actual numbers of Afghan National Police (ANP) operating within the country has long frustrated the international community, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The lack of basic knowledge, including the numbers of police and quality of weapons and other equipment, has resulted in many requests from the Government of Afghanistan and international community, most notably in the Policy Action Group (PAG), for a full accounting of the policemen serving in each province. Previous attempts to gather this information were inconclusive and flawed due to the poor infrastructure, a lack of transportation assets, and especially the lack of security in the south. The Dyncorp ID Unit has gathered some data on the number of police by registering patrolmen and issuing ID cards, however, this process is ongoing and still incomplete. Task Force Phoenix (TF Phoenix) recently began an accountability initiative to do a baseline assessment of the numbers of police operating in each region and province. This initiative may provide long-awaited data on the number of police forces and could also provide a partial measurement of the quality of the ANP. However, assessments down to the district level are needed to ensure accountability and adequately evaluate the ANP,s ability to enforce the rule of law and provide security for the citizens of Afghanistan.

## Unquantifiable Police Numbers

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2.(C/REL ISAF) Over four months ago, the Ministry of Finance, Security Operations Group (SOG) and Policy Action Group (PAG) requested a country-wide count of the ANP. This audit was scheduled to start in Zabul province and then proceed to other provinces. However, because of insurmountable logistical challenges and an inability to travel within the province, this initial attempt to count policemen and validate the quantity and quality of ANP equipment failed. The data was inconclusive and was unable to answer the most basic question: How many police are operating in Zabul? It also could not identify the quantity of weapons and communications equipment present or the operational capability of the deployed police forces.

3.(C/REL ISAF) Except for DynCorp's current effort to register and provide police ID cards, there is no process in place to reliably determine the number of Afghan National Police (ANP) serving throughout the nation. By contrast, the Afghan National Army (ANA) benefits from the presence of Embedded Tactical Training Teams and Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams, which operate from Corps to Company levels, and greatly assist with the tracking of ANA soldiers. Additionally, the ANA

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operates in relatively large groups at forward operating bases (FOBs) which also makes accountability slightly easier. Although the Police Academy and Regional Training Centers can accurately track the number of policemen trained, once the patrolmen leave the training centers, maintaining accountability becomes problematic and in many cases the individuals vanish into the districts and accountability is lost. The ability of the provincial headquarters to properly track the number of police in the districts is also suspect due to incomplete, manual records which often contain errors. The shortage, at the district level, of civilian police and military mentors is yet another obstacle that hinders adequate and accurate ANP tracking.

4.(C/REL ISAF) The lack of mentors, coupled with the poor infrastructure and elevated security situation, which makes travel to remote districts extremely dangerous, increases the difficulty of establishing and maintaining proper accountability. Without this data, it is not possible to determine ANP retention rates or the number of policemen absent without leave. Even using pay records to establish accountability is unreliable as many policemen are still paid by a trusted agent and widespread corruption still interferes with the maintenance of accurate pay records.

5.(C/REL ISAF) DynCorp currently implements a program to register patrolmen and provide police ID cards. While this program will eventually help reduce the number of "ghost" police, until the ID cards are linked to the pay system, it only provides a partial answer to how many policemen are operating within the country. To date, the DynCorp effort has registered 50,065 policemen of which 2,844 are Afghan National Auxiliary Police.

Of this, 34,397 police ID cards have been printed for personnel belonging to the ANP. ID Cards have not yet been printed for the ANAP because the MoI is behind in producing the required and certified vetting documents which are required to prove the identity of the ANAP patrolmen prior to the issuance of an ID card. Another very important benefit of this program is that it is building a national data base which currently does not exist. In the future, this data base could also incorporate award and evaluation data, training course completion dates and other personnel information which would make this a very powerful research and management tool. However, the most significant problem with this program continues to be obtaining the data from the MoI and from the provincial headquarters.

#### Impact on Security and Enforcing the Rule of Law

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6.(C/REL ISAF) The inability to identify the number of operational police precludes an accurate assessment of the ANP's impact on the security situation throughout the nation. Lacking this knowledge, it is not possible to determine if the police presence is sufficient to enforce the rule of law and provide adequate security to the populace. While the international community may think that there are enough trained policemen at the district level to provide security and prevent the populace from passively or actively

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supporting the insurgency, lacking a realistic accounting, there really is no way to ascertain the true situation. Moreover, although provincial Chiefs of Police may claim that they have 100% of their personnel authorizations, this cannot be proven. It is often beneficial for the Chief of Police to exaggerate his unit's manning status as it often results in him receiving additional, unauthorized salaries from "ghost" policemen which goes directly into his pockets. Exaggerated numbers of ANP also provides a false sense of security and does not necessarily equate to greater protection for the citizens of Afghanistan or a greater ability to enforce the rule of law; in many cases it simply serves to increase the personal wealth of corrupt police leaders.

#### Baseline Assessment Initiated

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7.(C/REL ISAF) In an attempt to identify the numbers of deployed and operational ANP, TF Phoenix recently deployed 4 10-man teams to the East, West, Central and North. The most recent of these teams was successfully deployed during the last week of February. Their goal is to record the number of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Patrolmen serving at the regional and provincial levels. They will also focus on the manning and equipping of the Border Police brigades and battalions. Additionally, the team intends to assess the tribal composition of the police units and the percentage of trained versus untrained patrolmen. The teams will note the quantity and quality of on-hand equipment (weapons, radios, vehicles, and uniforms), the status of operational headquarters and buildings used to feed and house the police, the pay status of the patrolmen, and finally will make a subjective evaluation of the individual and unit operational capabilities. The operational capabilities

assessment will attempt to identify how the police track the locations of additional ANP forces and other friendly forces operating in the same area, how they track and report threats, and finally their ability to report significant events to a higher headquarters. Since the Western Region has only 4 provinces, this team is expected to finish its assessment first and will then redeploy and complete an assessment of the provinces in the South. The initiative is on track to be completed by April 22, 2007.

8.(C/REL ISAF) This initiative is more likely to succeed than past attempts to ascertain ANP accountability because of Task Force Phoenix,s use of ANA FOBS and assets. Past assessments relied on the use of military air to transport teams to and from provincial centers and did not have the vehicles or logistics to support long-term operations and movement within the provinces. A significant advantage of the current plan is that by using the ANA FOBS, the teams will have access to security personnel that are already in place and therefore are familiar with the local area. Finally, the FOBS will provide a central location from which the teams can operate and return to upon completion of their assessments. Logistically, this plan more wisely uses the available assets to promote extensive operations throughout the regions. The ability to operate

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for a longer period within the provinces should result in a greater ability to more reliably determine the number of operational police and their operational capabilities.

Comment.

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9.(C/REL ISAF) Although this initiative is long overdue and is a good first step, it will still only provide a partial solution due to its focus at the regional and provincial levels. Even if successful at the regional and provincial levels, the omission of district-level information will still prevent any realistic analysis of recruiting retention rates and AWOL rates. However, this initiative should provide a more comprehensive picture of the ANP,s manning and equipping status than is currently available. This initiative is more likely to succeed than past attempts due to TF Phoenix,s plan to use ANA Forward Operating Bases to overcome the logistics and security challenges. However, the only way to attain true accountability is by placing substantially more civilian police and military mentors than are currently available at the district levels. Until district level assessments are done, we will not know whether there are enough ANP deployed to combat the insurgency and if the available ANP is strong enough to enforce the rule of law and protect the citizens of Afghanistan. The approval of additional military and civilian police mentors will be essential to successfully accomplishing this task. Additionally, the presence of "ghost" policemen and corruption will continue to detract from the development of a professional ANP. For the coalition to defeat the insurgency, we need to know that sufficient ANP forces are deployed and that they are capable of protecting local populations and preventing the insurgents from coercing support out in the villages.

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